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BOOK REVIEW
Large Scale Housing and Real Estate Firms-Analysis of a New
Business Enterprise. LEO GREBLER. New York, Washington,
London: Praeger Publishers. 1973. Pp. xx, 183. $15.00
1
The construction industry, by whatever standard one would
measure it, is undoubtedly an important one in the United States.'
It accounts for a very sizable percentage of the gross national
product2 and, at the same time, is an important employer of un-
skilled and semiskilled labor.3 It is, therefore, not surprising that
its health and performance are watched with great interest by
professional economists within and outside of the executive and
legislative branches of government. Inadequate housing, however
one may measure it, creates, and reflects, social problems and
impairs the quality of life for all. Thus, a housing policy and the
attainment of acceptable housing goals is an appropriate, indeed, a
mandatory concern of government.4 While all of this is true, it is
equally indisputable that housing in the past twenty years has
adopted a mystique all its own. It is apparent from pronounce-
ments by some of the leaders of Congress, and those testifying over
and over again at hearings on the subject, that housing has become
virtually an end in and of itself.
5
The "goal of a decent- home and a suitable living environment
for every American family"6 has been the rallying cry of the past
quarter century. Indeed, in 1968, the goal had been quantified as
I The total value of new construction for calendar year 1973 was $135,456,000,000 of
which $57,623,000,000 represented residential construction. The corresponding 1974
figures as of October 1974, seasonally adjusted to represent annual equivalents, were
$132,658,000,000 and $43,258,000,000, respectively. 60 FED. RES. BULL. A53 (Dec. 1974).
2 The gross national product for 1973 was $1,294.9 billion. Id. at A56. Thus, for that
year, the value of all new construction was approximately 10.5% of the gross national
product, and of residential construction, approximately 4.4%.
3 During the years 1962-66, the home building industry on the average employed 9.8%
semiskilled and 17% unskilled workmen. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON URBAN HoUSING,
A DECENT HOME 168 (1968).
4 Housing policies or goals as a component part of governmental activity are of fairly
recent origin. Fisher, Evaluation of National Housing Goals, 1 AMERICAN REAL ESTATE AND
URBAN ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION JOUR. 5 (Fall 1973) [hereinafter cited as AREUEA JOUR.].
' See, e.g., The Credit Crunch and Reform of Financial Institutions, Hearings Before the H.R.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 41-54 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as 1973 House Hearings] (statement-of George C. Martin, President, National Association of
Home Builders).
6 Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
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26 million new or rehabilitated units within a decade.7 The de-
veloping mystique has led, in turn, to the emergence of neo-
populist attitudes in the area,8 and to a breathless pursuit of the
magic key which would unlock the gates of the kingdom. Since
the atmosphere was and is highly emotional, it is conducive to
myth-making. 9 One myth was that of size and mass production.
There were those who, twenty or more years ago, envisaged the
solution of construction and housing dilemmas by "a General
Motors" of the building industry.' 0 Quite aside from the policy
considerations of the concentration of economic power, the recent
experiences of the auto industry, and in particular in the past few
years its unwillingness or inability to respond to changing situa-
tions, should be a warning about too much reliance on size as a
solution. A different facet of the same myth was Operation Break-
through, initiated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), which was to test and develop new processes
and systems." A variant of this was the proposition that an aero-
space systems approach would be a panacea for urban ills.'
2
A concomitant to the search for a magic key and the birth of
myth is a recurrence of "crises." At the present time we are in the
midst of such a housing "crisis. ' ' 3 We have experienced in the last
few years several credit crises, particularly those of 1966, '69-'70,
and then '73-'74. We, of course, respond to crises by the enactment
of "emergency" legislation.' 4 It does not matter that generally an
7 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1601, 82 Stat.
601, 42 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970). It has been recently suggested that this quantification may
have greatly contributed to the increase in the cost of housing. Fisher, supra note 4, at 16.
8 See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, pt. 1, at 305-09 (statement of Congressman Patman).
9 One commentator estimated that the average birth rate for myths is one per month.
Grigsby, Real Estate and Urban Land Economics: Illusions of Progress?, I AREUEA JouR. 4 (June
1973).
10 See, e.g., p. xiii.
11 Operation Breakthrough was mandated by the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 108, 82 Stat. 495, 12 U.S.C. § 1701z (1970).
12 See, e.g., Stegman, The New Mythology of Housing, 7 TRANs-ACTION 55, 58-59 (Jan.
1970).
13 The statistics for housing for the first half of 1974 indicate that the private housing
permits issued during that period, as compared to figures for the first'six months of 1973,
decreased by 38%, the decrease for one-to-four-family units being 30%, and for apartments
being 49% U.S. HoUSING TRENDS 4 (Advance Mortgage Corp.) (on file at the Cornell
Law Review).
For a graphic description of the problems faced by prospective home buyers, see Wall
St. J., Oct. 11, 1974, at I, col. 6.
For an industry point of view, see Gibbons, Cost-Push Variety of Inflation Threatens
Feasibility of Real Estate Development, 42 APPRAISAL J. 485 (1974).
,4 See, e.g., Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450
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"emergency" statute is enacted and becomes operative after the
"crisis" which prompted it has already passed, and that everybody
concerned must or should have known that it could not possibly be
implemented in time to remedy the situation which ostensibly gave
impetus to its enactment.
There is a certain air of unreality about all this activity both
outside and within the academic community.' 5 However interesting
the modern myths might be to some future historian who will retell
the story of our generation, they do very little, if anything, toward
solution or even identification of our problems and, therefore, the
formulation of workable programs.
II
However, a welcome breath of fresh air penetrated into the
discussion of housing with the publication late in 1973 of Professor
Leo Grebler's latest book, Large Scale Housing and Real Estate
Firms,' 6 which deals with the real estate construction and develop-
ment industry from 1963 through 1972. The author gave a kind of
studio preview of his findings in an article published earlier in
1973,11 which, incidentally, touches also on matters not covered in
the book. This article is worth reading in its own right and those
who feel that they cannot afford the time to peruse the book
should look at the summary of the findings. However, such a
self-imposed limitation would be a pity; there is so much in the
book besides the conclusions that anybody seriously interested in
the problems of housing would enjoy the full treatment.
Before going any further, it is interesting to note the changes
in the order of magnitude, since the book deals with large real
estate enterprises. Dr. John P. Herzog, in a book published in
1963, defined a large construction firm as one producing 100 or
more housing units annually;18 Professor Grebler, only ten years
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.); Emergency Home Purchase Assistance Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-449, 88 Stat. 1364 (uncodified at date of publication).
15 As stated by Professor Grigsby, "much of the paper explosion [in the field of
housing and urban matters] represents a knowledge implosion-that is, the circulation of
incorrect and misleading information which contracts rather than expands the frontier of
knowledge." Grigsby, supra note 9, at 4.
16 Professor Grebler's earlier writings include: L. GREBLER, D. BLANK & L. WINNICK,
CAPITAL FORMATION IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE, TRENDS AND PROSPECTS (1956); L.
GREBLER, HOUSING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICY (1960); and the pioneering
study, 0. JONES & L. GREBLER, THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET: ITS PURPOSE,
PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL (1961).
17 Grebler, Growing Scale of Real Estate Firms and Projects, I AREUEA JOUR. 107 (June
1973).
18 J. HERZOG, THE DYNAMICS OF LARGE-SCALE HOUSEBUILDING 2 (1963).
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later, uses as his benchmark 1,000 units.19 The figures speak for
themselves.
Chapter 6, which is the final one of the work, consists of a
summary of the findings, and of a long list of topics which urgently
require empirical study. Throughout his findings the author urges
caution because of a lack of adequate data. However, some of the
trends seem to be clearly indicated. For one thing, Professor
Grebler believes, and I tend to agree with him, that the large firm
is here to stay. At the same time, his findings indicate that the
savings due to economies of scale, although they do exist, are more
modest than once believed-between four and five percent. These
savings are achieved partly through the ability, particularly in times
of tight money, to obtain loans at more advantageous rates, and
partly through wholesale purchases of materials. On the other
hand, some of these savings tend to be offset by increased over-
head costs. Here again Professor Grebler cautions us that direct
comparisons may be misleading since many of the costs that in the
case of the smaller producers are externalized and, therefore,
become direct expenses, are internalized within the large firms and
become part of the overhead.2 0 In any event, we cannot expect in
the foreseeable future any dramatic savings due .to size. On the
other hand, even a difference of four or five percent is significant
enough to give the large firm a distinct competitive advantage over
smaller ones. Whether this advantage will translate into higher
profits for the large firm or lower prices to the consumer will
depend, of course, on a number of factors, including competition.
Another of the major benefits of size is the ability to operate
simultaneously in a number of different areas. Depressed local
economic conditions due to overbuilding or other causes will not
have the same devastating effect on a firm which is geographically
dispersed. 21 This finding, by the way, explodes another myth,
which has been repeated so many times, that building is essentially
a local activity. 22 The construction of a particular house is, of
course, localized and the market for the house is in the particular
locality. However, it does not follow that the mobilization and
organization of the resources necessary to produce the house is








drugstore is a local activity, the production and marketing of the
same toothbrush is not. This seems to belabor the obvious but it is
brought out simply because of similar myths with respect to real
estate financing. At recent hearings before a congressional commit-
tee, executives of savings and loan associations made statements
indicating their belief that mortgage lending is a local activity. 23 To
use the same comparison, if by mortgage lending one means the
processing of a particular application and evaluation of the risk
involved, both as to the borrower and the property, including all
the relevant factors such as location, quality, economic outlook and
others, the statement is probably correct. However, if this means
that the mobilization of the financial resources necessary to make
the loan, whether direct or indirect through a sale of the paper, is
equally localized, this, of course, is not true. Home financing
operates in a national money market and competes with other
forms of investment for the available monetary resources. This
kind of provincialism is at least partly responsible for some of the
difficulties traditional home lenders experience.
24
In this same chapter, the author also indicates that some, but
by no means all, of the large scale builders and developers have
come to depend heavily on subsidized housing projects. 25 This
being the case, they are among the leaders in the lobbying effort
for a continuation of such endeavors, irrespective of whether these
projects produce the desired results or not.26 In the past, the
subsidies have gone primarily to the producer. The ultimate ex-
pression of this approach was section 235 of the National Housing
Act,27 the purpose of which was to make home ownership for
low-income families a reality. Whether the amount of the subsidy
was sufficient or insufficient, the approach was to qualify and issue
authorizations to builders or sellers, not to consumers. Thus,
section 235 homes could be bought only from HUD-approved
2 See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, pt. 2, at 670-71 (statement of Edward L. Johnson); id.
at 1079 (letter of Robert L. Davis); id. at 1080 (letter of Robert S. Gaiswinkler); id. at 1081-82
(letter of W. H. Gelbach, Jr.).
24 Id., pt. 1, at 71-90 (statement of Dr. Kenneth J. Thygerson). At the same hearings the
proposition was advanced in all seriousness that the activities of the Federal National
Mortgage Association which tend to eliminate interest differentials in different parts of the
country are responsible for high mortgage interest rates. Id., pt. 2, at 641-42 (testimony of
Randall E. Presley).
25 pp. 151-52.
26 The proposition that housing subsidies increase the number of housing starts has
recently been questioned. See Swan, Housing Subsidies and Housing Starts, 1 AREUEA JoUR.
119 (Fall 1973).
27 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1970). See 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(2) (1970).
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sellers or through HUD-approved brokers and financed with
mortgages from HUD-approved lenders. This, more than anything
else,28 led to widespread scandals and very unhappy experiences
with the program, such as over 10,000 vacant homes in the city of
Detroit.29 As Professor Grebler points out correctly, voices are
again heard to say that subsidization should be direct, rather than
indirect; that the subsidy should'be made to the consumer rather
than to the producer.30 The presence of large and powerful
economic entities, with their concomitant political power, vitally
interested in the continuation of the status quo, has implications
for the resolution of some of these basic policy questions.
III
Although Chapter 6, touched upon above, can be read alone
or first, I would consider it a great mistake to do so. The preceding
five chapters, which build logically to the conclusions presented in
that chapter, are so rich in content and range over such a wide
area, that anyone seriously interested in the subject should not miss
them. Unlike the authors of many recent publications, which have
rather flamboyant titles, but much more modest contents, Profes-
sor, Grebler manages to introduce many topics which would appear
not to be covered by the tide. In Chapter 1, he gives. a brief
description of the development of the large scale housing industry
during the years from 1963 through 1972. The sudden emergence
of the giants took place in one of three ways. First, certain firms
went public and equity securities of real estate corporations became
21 One of the most devastating analyses of this approach taken under § 235 is contained
in a report prepared by Professor Jack M. Guttentag as a United Nations consultant for the
government of Iran. See J. Guttentag, The Housing Finance System of Iran 69-75 (Aug.
1972). See also Aaron, Federal Housing Subsidies, in JOINT ECONOMIC CoMM., 92D CONG., 2D
SEss., THE ECONOMicS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS, pt. 5, at 589-91 (Comm. Print 1972).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently added its voice to the
chorus of criticism in Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 863-67 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2' According to latest newspaper reports, 60 persons and firms have so far been
convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in
connection with scandals involving primarily construction projects initiated under § 221
(d)(2) (12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(2) (1970)), as well as §§ 235 & 236 of the National Housing Act
(12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z, z-1 (1970)) in the Detroit Metropolitan area. The estimates of losses in
connection with these scandals start at $250 million. The Detroit News, March 7, 1974, at
17-A, col. I. For an overview of the national scene, see Wall St. J., March 19, 1974, at 1, col.
6, and The Detroit News, March 19, 1974, at 1-A, col. 4. For a more complete discussion of





acceptable to the investing public.3' It remains to be seen whether
this acceptance will survive the present uncertainties in the market.
The second method was that of mergers, particularly of the con-
glomerate kind. As is indicated later, 32 some of the conglomera-
tions have resulted in "deglomerations"-divestiture by a conglom-
erate of unrelated subsidiaries. Finally, some of the giants came
into being by internal expansion. 33
Chapter 2 presents a profile of the large firms.34 For purposes
of the study, Professor Grebler divides the industry into four
distinct groups based upon the type of activity involved; he notes,
of course, that while some firms remain primarily in one group,
others, either through the same corporation or through different
subsidiaries, participate in more than one or even in all four types
of activity. The four groups are on-site builders (those include
builders of single family residences and of multifamily structures),
manufacturers (prefabricated housing, mobile homes and modular
construction), land developers (recreational land development with
minimal, if any, building activity), and finally, builder-investors
(those who build primarily to hold for long-term investment).35 It
should also be noted that in many cases, as a result of expansion,
whether internal or conglomerate, all kinds of ancillary services are
included within the parent group, such as mortgage banking, title
insurance, escrow services, and similar activities. 36 The chapter
describes the first two groups, that is, on-site builders and man-
ufacturers, and gives their characteristics and their particular prob-
lems. It also ranges far afield discussing such phenomena as
Operation Breakthrough, new towns, and Housing Partnerships.
3 7
Chapter 3 is concerned with economies of scale. 38 It details the
various advantages of size, such as distribution of risk, the ease of
31 For an interesting recent discussion of trends, see Wendt, New Techniques of Financing
Real Estate, 1 AREUEA JOUR. 140 (June 1973).
32 Pp. 130-31. As the text indicates, approximately 20% of the acquisitions resulted in
"deglomeration" by late 1972.
3' Among the industrial giants branching into real estate are Chrysler, Ford, Goodyear,
Humble Oil, Libby-Owens-Ford, and Union Carbide. P. 11. It is also interesting to note that
an industrial corporation, Kaiser, and a financial one, Aetna Life, formed a partnership for
real estate development. Id. Finally, at least two corporations in other fields, namely
McCulloch Oil Corporation and Walt Disney Productions, have expanded to such an extent
into real estate that it is becoming their major activity. P. 12. Some of the corporations








financing (since funds can be obtained by direct access to the
money markets, rather than through intermediaries), and certain
economies in other costs. At the same time a caveat is added that a
price has to be paid: once a certain minimum size is reached, the
informality and freewheeling procedures traditionally employed by
builders are no longer acceptable or practicable. This poses a
dilemma to top management. On the one hand, there is always a
danger that opportunities can be missed when decisions are made
through proper channels and by committees. On the other hand,
the dangers of loss of control are very real ones, as shown by the
meteoric rise and quick demise of the real estate activities of the
Boise Cascade Corporation.
39
Chapter 4 analyzes the character of each one of the four
component parts of the "industry." Comparative charts indicate
their performance and their financial characteristics. Again the
author cautions that the data are by no means complete; in many
cases they are also not comparable. This lack of comparability has
been bothering the accounting profession for some time and a
move is afoot to revise the standards employed. This, if imple-
mented, may indeed increase comparability but, at least in the
short run, it may cause problems for some of the firms since their
restated financial statements may show that they are in fact much
less profitable than certain investors were led to believe. 40 In this
connection, it is also interesting to note that joint ventures among
large corporations, which in the past were generally associated with
large, single construction projects, such as dam building, have now
been extended to housing and other urban projects on a longer
range basis.
41
Finally, Chapter 5 deals with the conglomerate phenomenon.4 2
Some of the mergers have performed more or less as expected. In
other cases, however, the expectations have not been fulfilled. This
is true not only of Boise Cascade, but of others as well. 43 At the
The particular experiences of Boise Cascade are outlined in pp. 135-40. The book
quotes the president of Boise Cascade relating his experiences: "It is fair to say that the
housing business can, in time, turn any level-headed executive into a neurotic-or worse.
When times are good, they are very, very good, and when they are bad, they are horrid." P.
143.
40 Pp. 74-75, 106-07.
41 Besides the Kaiser-Aetna partnership (see note 33 supra) the book mentions continu-
ous joint ventures involving J. H. Snyder Co., Loews, and the Richards Group. P. 11.
42 Pp. 126-45.
43 The book mentions specifically the following acquiring corporations which have since
divested themselves of their real estate subsidiaries: Penn Central Transportation Co.,




time of the compilation of the book, ITT had consented to divest
itself of its Levitt subsidiary as part of the settlement of its antitrust
litigation. As Professor Grebler points out, it is by no means certain
that this was motivated solely by pressures exerted by the Justice
Department, but might very well have been a convenient excuse
for getting rid of an unwanted acquisition." The announcement
that the subsidiary has been resold to the original owners (there
was no other market for it) for an undisclosed amount, may very
well bear out this remark. 45 As the author shows, acquiring con-
glomerate parent companies have discovered that in many cases
they lacked the skills necessary to run such subsidiaries. The
transferability of top management with financial or manufacturing
backgrounds to the real estate industry is very limited indeed.
46
IV
The study seems to be exhaustive within its own perimeters, as
far as available data would permit. Professor Grebler has suggested
a long list of topics for future research, including financing.47 In
the past decade, important changes have taken place in the ways in
which real estate is being financed. That is why the Hunt Commis-
sion Report48 and the Treasury Recommendations 49 based upon it,
which are now pending before Congress,50 and which were the
subject of hearings before the House Committee on Banking and
Currency, 51 leave one with the uneasy feeling that they are ad-
4 P. 130.
45 Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1974, at 6, col. 1. This announcement seems to have been
premature. ITT later indicated that it could not meet the deadline imposed by the court (id.,
Sept. 24, 1974, at 6, col. 2) and further negotiations with the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice are continuing. Id., Oct. 25, 1974, at 14, col. 3.
The book also mentions the inflated prices paid by some of the acquiring corporations,
e.g., CNA Financial Corp., in its acquisition of the Larwin Group. Pp. 127-28. This operation
also seems to be experiencing financial difficulties. Wall St. J., March 12, 1974, at 14, col. 1.
For a description of the problems of the Larwin Group in the New York market, caused in
part by its use of California building techniques and styles in a different climate, see Wall St.
J., Oct. 24, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
46 Pp. 143-45.
17 Pp. 161-65.
48 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION, REPORT (1973).
For a somewhat different emphasis and detailed discussion of the proposals, see Verkuil,
Perspectives on Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE L.J. 1349 (1974.)
49 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL
SYSTEM (Aug. 3, 1973).
50 H.R. 10990, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S. 2591, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). (Since
the writing of this Book Review, the ninety-third Congress has ended without congressional
action on either measure.)
31 1973 House Hearings. Hearings also were held on Nov. 6, 7, and 8, 1973, before the
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dressed more to past history than future needs or trends. The
large institutional investors, particularly life insurance companies,
are no longer satisfied merely to be lenders; they want "a piece of
the action. '52 This is motivated in part by the threat of continuing
inflation.53 The "one-two-three transaction" has become a battle cry
of the life insurance industry.5 4 The instruments and devices to
secure loans become more and more complicated, although those
active in the field prefer the term sophisticated. Those complex
arrangements pose very serious problems, particularly since a
combination of tax provisions and a desire for continued growth
favor the highest possible leverage. 55 The choking noose of the
wrap-around mortgage may yet prove to be the undoing of many
real estate projects. 56 Although many developers might have
"mortgaged-out" there will be others who will have to try to pick
up the pieces.
Real estate syndicates, generally limited partnerships,
5 7
Senate Committee: Financial Structure and Regulation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Finan-
dal Inst. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
52 See, e.g., recent articles by counsel for regulated institutional lenders: Gunning &
Roegge, Contemporary Real Estate Financing Techniques: A Dialogue on Vanishing Simplicity, 3
REAL PROPERTY, PROB. & TRUST J. 325 (1968); Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity
Investments and the Institutional Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FORDHAM L. REV.
579 (1971).
" Gunning & Roegge, supra note 52, at 327; Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 52,
at 583-84.
54 In the "one-two-three transaction," the developer sells the land to the institutional
lender, or has the lender buy it directly, thereby obtaining 100% financing. The lender
leases back the land on a long-term net-net ground lease, and enters into a commitment to
make the permanent leasehold mortgage on the structure to be.constructed, on the basis of
which the developer then obtains construction financing. Finally, the institutional lender
obtains a participation in the overriding equity, anything up to 50%. For further discussion
of the technique, see Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 52, at 588-89.
15 Leverage is the relationship between actual equity investment of the developer and
the value of the6 project. As the equity investment decreases, leverage increases. For further
discussions of the principle, see McKee, The Real Estate Tax Shelter: A Computerized Exposb, 57
VA. L. REv. 521 (1971); authorities cited in'Bartke, Fannie Mae and the Secondary Mortgage
Market, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 3-4 nn.9-11 (1971).
56 The "wrap-around mortgage" is a fancy name for a second mortgage tailored to
increase the effective rate of return to the second mortgagee. Frequently, as payments on
the wrap-around mortgage are received, the de facto investment or' the wrap-around
mortgagee increases, at least for a time, rather than decreases. For further discussion, see
Gunning, The Wrap-Around Mortgage... Friend or U.F.O., ICSC (INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF
SHOPPING CENTERS) SHOPPING CENTER REPORT No. 22 (1969).
57 For a short general discussion, see Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 52, at
600-07. This vehicle is generally used because of tax considerations. For a more extended
discussion, see Zarrow, Tax Shelters and the Public-New Uses for Limited Partnerships and Joint
Ventures, 1970 S. CAL. TAX INST. 277. In this connection, consider the implications of Rev.
Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 735, discussed in Comment, Tax Classification of the Limited
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and real estate investments trusts (REITTs),58 also are not
explored, although there is a plea for more study. As Professor
Grebler says:
The literature on real estate investment trusts and on syndicates
is either wholly descriptive or analyzes various technical as-
pects.... Many journal articles on these and similar subjects are
written by insiders or lawyers and accountants whose profes-
sional interest precludes analysis from a broad economic point of
view.5 9
Judging by certain articles published in the not-so-distant past,
lawyers should be left with a somewhat uncomfortable feeling.60
V
As indicated in the book, the large firms weathered the con-
struction declines of 1966 and 1969-70 much better than the
industry as a whole. However, it is also pointed out that these
declines were of relatively short duration. Whether the large firms
can perform equally well in more severe and prolonged situations
is another matter.61 The book indicates that the very high construc-
tion rates which prevailed in 1972 could not last much longer. This
seems prophetic in view of the downward trend starting in early
1973, which has precipitated the present "housing crisis.
'62
Partnership with a Sole Corporate General Partner Under the Regulations and Revenue Procedure
72-13, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 135 (1973).
58 These are the entities qualifying under the provisions of Part 11 of Subchapter M,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856-858.
59 P. 161. For a recent example of such an article written by a REIT executive, see
Smith, Real Estate Investment Trusts--"The New Billionaires," 42 APPRAiSAL J. 129 (1974).
Despite the title, some REITs are experiencing financial difficulties and one has started a
proceeding under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act. Wall St.J., March 18, 1974, at 5, col. 1.
Some REITs are shedding their special status, either because they find the restrictions of the
Code too confining, or as a means out of financial embarrassment. Id., Oct. 25, 1974, at 2,
col. 3.
60 See, e.g., Jensen, The Real Estate Investment Trust: Receptacle for Foreclosed Property and
Nonconforming Loans, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 70 (1969). The article advocates that savings and
loan associations form REITs to which they could, from time to time, transfer nonconform-
ing investments, particularly foreclosed properties and loans to facilitate-that is, loans in
excess of the limits permitted by regulatory laws to facilitate the sale of foreclosed proper-
ties. Although the article purports to indicate benefits flowing to both savings and loan
associations and the investors in the REIT, the advocacy of the establishment by a regulated
lender, in a fiduciary capacity, of a REIT with securities to be sold to the public for the
express purpose of dumping into it the lender's own mistakes raises serious questions.
61 P. 151. Recently GAC Corp., a conglomerate which entered the land development
field through acquisitions (Pp. 133-34), entered into a consent decree with the Federal Trade
Commission which provides, inter alia, for more than $17 million in restitution to purchas-
ers, in connection with the sale of lots in Arizona and Florida. GAC Corp. has also
withdrawn from the business of selling lots. 42 U.S.L.W. 2508 (1974).
62 The downturn seems to have started in February or March of 1973. See 60 FED. REs.
BOOK REVIEW
Although there are those who would blame the decline en-
tirely on the decision of the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board to raise the limits on interest payable on
passbook savings accounts and on certain investment certificates, 63
this would seem to be a gross oversimplification of a complex
phenomenon. Nevertheless, the months and even years ahead are
likely to be troubled ones. The "energy crisis," which many attrib-
ute to the Arab embargo, as if its roots were not many years in the
past, will pose challenges and problems for the construction indus-
try. Professor Grebler foresees a major test toward the end of the
1970's when the household formation rate is bound to decline
because the wartime baby boom will by then pass marriageable age.
in view of more recent events, the test may come sooner than
that.
64
The question has been asked repeatedly whether the mistakes
of the past are being repeated; more specifically, whether the real
estate developments of the 1920's, which burst like punctured
balloons and went under in the Great Depression, are again on the
horizon. 65 On the whole, Professor Grebler does not believe that to
be true, although he admits that recreational developments bear a
close resemblance to some of the subdivisions in metropolitan areas
started in the 1920's.66 Again, answers to some of these questions
may come sooner than could have been foreseen at the time the
study was being prepared.
VI
On the whole the book is very well written and is remarkably
free from intrusive jargon. The tables are easy to understand and
BULL. A63 (Jan. 1974); address by HUD Secretary Lynn, National Association of Home
Builders Convention, Jan. 21, 1974 (reprinted in TITLE NEWS, March 1974, at 4). It should
also be noted, however, that housing starts increased substantially in February. Wall St. J.,
March 19, 1974, at 5, col. 2. The February upturn was followed by further declines
throughout the year. The total housing starts for 1974 were 1,340,000, as compared to
2,050,000 in 1973. The seasonally adjusted annual rate for December 1974 was 868,000
units, the lowest rate for any month since October 1966. Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1975, at 2,
col. 2.
" See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings 42-44 (testimony of George C. Martin, President,
National Association of Home Builders). But see id. at 313-15 (statement of Dr. Arthur
Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
" National Homes Corporation, a highly diversified, publicly held company discussed
in Professor Grebler's book, announced substantial losses for 1973. Wall St. J., March 5,
1974, at 6, col. 4. The only profitable operations were prefabricated housing (which,






illustrate the points made. The book is easily understood by an
informed reader with no particular economic training. It is de-
signed to inform and stimulate rather than obscure or overawe.67
At the end of the book the publishers have included a short
biographical sketch of the author.68 From this we learn that Profes-
sor Grebler has retired from the faculty of the University of
California at Los Angeles. The publication of this book would
indicate that his retirement does not mean a termination of active
research. For those of us who have come to depend upon his
scholarship, that is very good news indeed.
The book does not approach the housing problem directly, but
indirectly shows that some of our programs are defective. Market
mechanisms have operated successfully in the past to provide
housing for the great majority of American people, although
improvements, particularly in the area of financing, are definitely
called for.69 On the other hand, the people at the two extremes
of the economic spectrum, for opposite reasons, are essentially
outside of the area affected by market forces, as far as shelter is
concerned. The very rich command such resources that their
decisions about housing are dictated solely by personal prefer-
ences. The very poor do not have enough resources to compete in
the market. Their plight is not a lack of housing but a lack of
money. It seems to follow from this that attempts to alleviate the
situation by tampering with the market mechanism are expensive,
cannot be successful, and distort the market itself, primarily by
introducing anti-competitive elements.70 The findings of Professor
Grebler's study, which point out the inexorable economics of
house building, clearly indicate this. Our national policies should
now be shaped to reflect this basic problem.
7 1
Richard W. Bartke*
67 See, e.g., Professor Grigsby's criticism of the model makers. Grigsby, supra note
9, at 6.
68 P. 183.
69 Of course, witb the advent of double-digit inflation, a large segment of the popula-
tion is rapidly being priced out of the home-buying market. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 3,
1974, at 1, col. 6.
70 See, e.g., Bartke, Home Financing at the Crossroads-A Study of the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, 48 IND. L.J. 1, 41-42 (1972); Fisher, supra note 4, at 15-19; Swan, supra
note 26.
71 Cf. a new approach formed in the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 633 (uncodified at date of publication), adding a
new § 8 to the United States Housing Act of'1937, providing for support rental payments.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1954, J.D. 1956, University of
Washington; LL.M. 1967, Yale University.
